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The vulnerability of the dead 
 
1. If death is the end of us, the extinction of the personal subject, then it seems the merest common 
sense to suppose that the dead can be neither benefited nor injured.  For how could there be a harm or 
a benefit without an existing subject to be harmed or benefited?   If harms set back interests and 
benefits promote them (cf. Feinberg 1990: xxvii), then neither appears possible in the absence of an 
interest-holder.  Events occurring after a person’s death would seem to be too late to have any effect 
on a person’s life.   Although an interest that a person had during life (e.g. to bring up her children to 
be virtuous citizens) may be thwarted after death (the children grow up to be layabouts or bank 
robbers), crucially this appears to have no effect on her life.  This common-sense intuition has been 
forcefully emphasised by a number of recent writers.   For instance, James Stacey Taylor writes that 
‘the lives of person whose interests are thwarted post-mortem will not be affected by such thwarting’ 
(Taylor 2005: 316), while Christopher Belshaw contends that there can be no harm after death, since 
‘the notion of harm seems to point to some description of your internal condition – it is not as good as 
it was, or not as good as it would otherwise have been’; and the dead (as distinct from their corpses) 
plainly have no ‘internal condition’ (Belshaw 2009: 151).    
    These writers, and others, consequently reject the influential account offered by George Pitcher and 
Joel Feinberg that defends the notion of posthumous harm and benefit by claiming that its real subject 
is not the postmortem but rather the antemortem person (Pitcher 1984, Feinberg 1984).   This view, if 
at first sight surprising, relies on the perfectly reasonable idea that the significance of acts and 
enterprises is often determined by things that happen at a later date.  Thus if I devote time and energy 
to winning selection in the British Olympic tobogganing team or reading for a degree in nuclear 
physics, my failure to achieve either of these goals renders what I had previously been doing futile 
effort.  Likewise Brown is successfully raising his children to be staunch defenders of the faith if they 
continue to fight the good fight long after he is dead.  Were Brown’s offspring to abandon their 
religion as soon as their father was cold in the ground, then it would be clear that his project had been 
a fruitless one.  Proponents of the Pitcher-Feinberg line point out that no objectionable backwards 
causation is posited on their account.  Posthumous events are not taken to change the past but, rather, 
to make it the case that certain things were true all along.  So it was true at the time that Brown was 
raising fighters for the faith rather than backsliders, though this could not have been known before his 
death.  The backward light or shadow that posthumous events cast over a life is, so to speak, logical 
rather than causal.  In the words of Walter Glannon, ‘the future event of the thwarting of my present 
interests logically entails that I am now (while alive) harmed, even though I do not know it’ (Glannon 
2001: 138).   
     The obvious attraction of the Pitcher-Feinberg view is that it disposes of the problem of the 
missing subject of posthumous benefit and harm by identifying the indisputably existent antemortem 
person as their real subject.  While the harming event has a posthumous date, the timing of the harm 
falls within the subject’s lifetime (according to Feinberg, it commences at the point when the subject 
acquires the interest that is subsequently to be thwarted (Feinberg 1984: 92)).  Yet many critics have 
felt that this ‘solution’ has too great a whiff of paradox about it.  Glannon is typical of writers who 
object that ‘[the idea of] harm is best captured, not in terms of the logical notion of entailment 
between the interest and its being thwarted, but rather in terms of the causal relation between the 
interest and the state of affairs that thwarts it by obtaining or not obtaining’.  Since harm comprises ‘a 
genuine change in the person’s intrinsic properties of body and mind from a better-off to a worse-off 
condition’ (Glannon 2001: 138-9), and the living person suffers no such change, it follows that the 
antemortem subject is not genuinely harmed by anything that takes place after her death.  But since 
there is no post-mortem person to undergo a change for the worse, the very idea of posthumous harm 
(and benefit) must be rejected.  
    Although opponents of Pitcher/Feinberg typically claim that their objections command intuitive 
support, it can hardly be said that common sense is committed to an unequivocal rejection of the 
possibility that events occurring after a person’s death can be good or bad for him or her.  Aristotle 
remarks that someone who enjoys prosperity through much of his life but then, like King Priam of 
Troy, falls into misfortune in old age is not called ‘happy’ (eudaimon).  He cites Solon’s authority for 
the view that all appraisals of the success or failure of a person’s life are merely provisional until we 
can ‘see the end’ (Aristotle 1100a; 1954: 19).  The disasters that overtook King Priam, his family and 
his city, following the Greek assault in revenge for the abduction of Helen, effectively destroyed 
everything that Priam cared about, violently frustrating all his projects.   
   Imagine, however, that Priam had instead died while the Greek invasion force was still at sea, its 
advent totally unsuspected by the Trojans. In that case Priam would have ended his life able to look 
back with satisfaction upon a lifetime of fulfilled projects.  That Troy and the Trojans were about to 
suffer catastrophe would not have affected the dying King’s ‘internal condition’ or changed any of his 
‘intrinsic properties of body and mind’ from a better to a worse state.  By dying then Priam would 
have escaped the anguish of seeing his hopes dashed, his fifty sons and daughters slain and his 
enemies triumphant.  Yet it seems distinctly counter-intuitive to suppose that everything would 
therefore have been all right with him.  Whether Priam died shortly before or shortly after the Greeks 
arrived and started laying waste to his kingdom makes scant difference to the judgement we make of 
his life, knowing as we do the outcome of the war. 1  Aristotle himself shares this intuition, writing 
that ‘both good and evil are thought to exist for a dead man, as much as for the one who is alive but 
not aware of them; e.g. honours and dishonours and the good or bad fortunes of children and in 
general of descendants’ (1100a; 1954: 19).  Priam appears a tragic figure even on the scenario in 
which he dies in blissful ignorance of the fate about to overtake his city; indeed, in one perspective it 
was worse for him to die before the Greek invasion since it meant that he died deluded.  Forthcoming 
events cast their dark backward shadow, and the Trojan disaster can be regarded as bad for Priam 
even if he is no longer alive when it happens.  For what appeared to be Priam’s solid and lasting 
achievement, it now transpires, was nothing of the kind. 
     It is a further question how long after a person’s death the fulfilment or thwarting of his interests 
can make a difference to him.  Would it still have been bad for Priam if his city had been destroyed by 
the Greeks a hundred years later?  Arguably it would not; or at any rate not as bad.  The reason is that 
Priam is unlikely to have cared so much about the temporally remote fate of his city and descendants 
as about their more proximate fortunes, with which he has stronger causal and emotional ties.  Such 
discounting for time may not always be appropriate, however.  For instance, a poet who aspired to 
immortal fame might be more concerned to be remembered two thousand years after his death than a 
mere two hundred.  But Priam’s case gives comfort to the supporters of Pitcher and Feinberg by 
revealing the strength of the intuition that we may legitimately look beyond the termination of his life 
when estimating a person’s goods and ills.   
     Probably some dissatisfaction with the Pitcher/Feinberg view stems from misunderstanding what it 
actually asserts.  Opponents of the claim that a person can suffer harm posthumously constantly 
reiterate that there can be no harm in the absence of an existing subject with ‘intrinsic properties’.  But 
Pitcher and Feinberg have no quarrel with this claim.  Their view is not that a person can suffer 
posthumous harm, but that harming events can occur posthumously.  The confusion arises because the 
question ‘Can the dead be harmed?’ is ambiguous.  It admittedly stretches credulity to assert that 
something that does not exist can be harmed or benefited.  But to say that events occurring after a 
person’s death can be harmful or beneficial to him is to assert a very different proposition.  Pitcher 
and Feinberg attempt to explain how this is possible even though no changes occur to a subject’s 
intrinsic properties after death – when there is no longer a subject to have intrinsic properties.  Since 
their claim is that posthumous events affect the well-being of the antemortem subject, it is potentially 
misleading to describe them as offering a theory of posthumous harm and benefit.       
  
2. Yet there are grounds for some scepticism about the Pitcher/Feinberg view even when it is properly 
understood.  If the case of Priam described above offers some support for it, here is another that 
doesn’t.   Imagine a painter – call him Vin Gough – who, though passionately devoted to his art, lacks 
self-confidence in his talent and craves a critical acclaim which he finds perennially elusive.  
Ambitious to produce well-regarded work, he attracts only the scorn of the art-establishment and the 
laughter of the public.  So unpopular, in fact, are Vin Gough’s colourful but unconventional 
representations of chrysanthemums and cornfields that he scarcely ever manages to sell a picture.  
Eventually he dies poverty-stricken and unhappy in a garret, firmly believing his life and career to 
have been a failure.  But in the years after his death, changes in taste prompt a critical reassessment 
and the artist derided by all comes to be viewed as one of the most innovative painters of his day.  It is 
now apparent that Vin Gough had been painting masterpieces although no one had recognised them as 
such.  Far from being a failure, his oeuvre is now held to mark a milestone in Western art, and 
galleries and connoisseurs pay millions for the privilege of owning his pictures.   
     Vin Gough’s ambition to paint works that win the approval of the best critics would seem amply 
fulfilled by the posthumous ‘discovery’ of his work and the acclaim it receives.  Therefore, on the 
Pitcher/Feinberg theory they should count as being good for him, despite coming too late to give him 
any personal satisfaction.  This might be glossed by saying that Vin Gough was successfully doing 
what he set out to do, even though he didn’t know it (and died believing the opposite to be true).  Yet 
it sounds strained to describe the level of the antemortem painter’s well-being as being raised by his 
unwittingly successful pursuit of this end. If this is what the Pitcher/Feinberg line implies, then it 
seems to be operating with a very questionable concept of well-being.  For the posthumous fame that 
awaited the sad and despairing Vin Gough did him – apparently – no good whatever at the time.  Had 
history been different and the painter never attained posthumous celebrity, the miserable conditions of 
his life would have been exactly the same.  The discovery of his work after his death does nothing to 
make Vin Gough’s life go better, even if it enriches many other lives.     
    The obvious question here is: what is the difference between these cases that makes the difference 
in our spontaneous reactions to them?  The later failure of Priam’s projects does appear to have a 
negative bearing on the quality of his life, whereas the posthumous accomplishment of Vin Gough’s 
ambitions seems to have no corresponding positive impact on the quality of his.  Why should this be?  
Or are our intuitions merely confused and inconsistent?  Theorists who reject Pitcher/Feinberg may 
contend that the intuitions in the latter case are stronger than those in the former, and deserve to be 
given the precedence.  While we might have some inclination to regard the catastrophe that occurs 
after Priam’s death as casting a dark backward shadow over his life, we will more probably be 
impressed by the inability of the posthumous changes to Vin Gough’s reputation to lift his life from 
the pit of despond.  If this is so, the best way to make our ideas coherent is to jettison 
Pitcher/Feinberg. 
     However, I think this would be a mistake.  Well-being is a complex notion, notoriously hard to 
analyse, and elements of different sorts contribute to its make-up.  If the felt quality of the subject’s 
experiences – roughly speaking, the amount of satisfaction or enjoyment he gets out of life – is the 
most obvious gauge of his well-being, it is not the only one, and in some lives may not even be the 
most important.  Some people are less concerned to garner subjective satisfactions than to ensure that 
their lives are directed on objectively valuable ends (or what they consider to be such); and amongst 
these may be some whose accomplishment will be posthumous – e.g. Brown’s goal of raising children 
to be stalwart fighters for the faith after he is dead.  Brown’s successfully pursuing this project, even 
though the success will not be known while he is alive (and thus cannot be a source of satisfaction to 
him), might reasonably be regarded as good for him, since it means that his life is going as he wishes 
it to do.    
   Many philosophers have recognised a distinction between subjective and objective components of 
well-being, where the former have to do with how his life feels to a subject, and the latter with the 
quality of the contents of his life as measured by some independent standard of value.  So it has 
become commonplace to remark that an individual might take a lot of satisfaction in what, from a 
more objective standpoint, may be considered to be fairly worthless activities, while in contrast a life 
may be filled with valuable activities and projects that fail to give the subject much pleasure.  (Parfit 
has persuasively argued that the life of maximum well-being would be one in which the subject takes 
his greatest pleasures from the pursuit of highly worthwhile activities [Parfit 1986: 501-02]).  Some 
writers place more importance on the subjective aspects of well-being, others on the objective.  A 
plausible hypothesis is that those who are inclined towards the first line will generally be less 
sympathetic to the Pitcher/Feinberg view than those who tend towards the second.  For views which 
privilege the subjective aspects of well-being will plainly struggle to explain how posthumous events 
could matter to the antemortem subject when they make no difference to his subjective experience.  
By contrast, views which focus on how well a person’s acts, desires, projects and ambitions are 
fulfilled can better accommodate the thought that posthumous events that fulfil or frustrate his various 
enterprises can affect their antemortem significance.  On these accounts, the absence of any awareness 
of them by the antemortem subject is not a problem, because it is their fruitfulness or futility rather 
than the consciousness of it which determines their contribution to his well-being.   
   Note, however, that the preceding paragraph slurs over an important distinction.  It is one thing for a 
person to pursue ends that she believes to be objectively valuable and another for those ends actually 
to be valuable.  This raises the question of whether it benefits a person to have any of her goals 
fulfilled, or only those whose fulfilment is genuinely a good thing.  Suppose that the faith which 
Brown is raising his children to defend is a morally obnoxious one, involving hecatombs of human or 
animal sacrifice.  Or consider Brown’s German cousin Braun, whose children, brought up to be 
lifelong Nazis, retain their fanatical devotion to the Führer long after their father’s death.  Is the 
fulfilment of their projects good for Brown and Braun, or are they, on the contrary, damaged by 
having successfully promoted bad ends?     
     Because this question concerns people’s valued goals in general and not only those with a 
posthumous fulfilment date, I shall not attempt to settle it here.  Different views are possible 
according to how moralistic one thinks a theory of well-being ought to be.  Philosophers who believe 
that no one can flourish without the moral virtues will not see a person’s well-being as being 
enhanced by the success (antemortem or posthumous) of her morally misguided schemes.  (These 
philosophers will also be equally moralistic about which subjective states are genuinely good for us, 
refusing to allow, e.g., that any pleasure taken in cruelty could contribute to our well-being.)  Since 
the least problematic cases are those in which what a person takes to be valuable either genuinely is so 
or is at any rate morally neutral, these are the sort on which, for the sake of simplicity, I shall focus in 
the remainder of this essay.   
    Sometimes writers arguing about the merits of Pitcher/Feinberg seem to be talking past each other 
because they have in mind quite disparate conceptions of well-being.  As an illustrative example, 
Steven Luper – a defender of the line – is accused by Christopher Belshaw of providing ‘no reasons’ 
for his claim that it is good for a person who has invested a great deal of time and energy in the search 
for a cure for lung cancer within ten years if a cure is found within that period though he is not 
himself alive to see it (Luper 2004: 69; Belshaw 2009: 141).  Belshaw concedes that the researcher 
has an interest in finding a cure for lung cancer but he denies that it could be in any way in his 
interests for a cure to be discovered posthumously.  The thrust of his discussion is that posthumous 
events have no actual or potential impact on the subject’s experience.  Imagine, he says, spending 
years writing a book that is a total flop after your death.  It might alternatively have done very well.  
But – the crucial point – ‘[e]ither way, your experience is the same’ (Belshaw 2009: 144).  Belshaw’s 
criticism of Luper and Pitcher/Feinberg could, though, be regarded as begging the question in favour 
of a subjectivist understanding of well-being that, whatever may be said for it, is not the only 
contender in the field.   
     It is now possible to explain why our spontaneous responses to the cases of Priam and Vin Gough 
seemed to be out of alignment with each other.  The key is that, given the way these examples were 
described, the more significant features of Priam’s situation were the more ‘objective’ ones, 
concerning the solidity and durability of his lifetime projects, while in Vin Gough’s case attention 
naturally focused on the misery of his lifetime experience, which contrasted so ironically with his 
posthumous celebrity.  Thus the suspected intuitional incoherence turns out to have been more 
apparent than real.  It is not just that our leanings towards one or another account of well-being may 
affect our attitude to the Pitcher/Feinberg line.  The fact is that, unless we are to be narrowly and 
dogmatically assertive that either an objectivist or a subjectivist view of well-being is the only correct 
one, we can afford to admit that, in different cases, objective and subjective elements can vary in 
degree of importance.  So we might hold that what mattered most in Priam’s case was the tragic 
transience of the literal and metaphorical castles he had built, whereas in Vin Gough’s the most salient 
feature was the painful, unremitting lifetime disappointment of his hopes and dreams.   
    One could conceive of these cases being different.  King Priam might have been chiefly interested 
in living a selfish life of idle luxury amidst his obedient and obliging subjects, caring little for what 
would befall his city or his family following his death.  ‘I’m not really bothered about what happens 
to Troy afterwards,’ he might have said, ‘provided that I can go on enjoying life up to my dying 
moment.  After that, if the sky falls, it’s no skin off my nose.’  This sybaritic Priam is a morally less 
attractive character than the tragic figure familiar from the Greek stories, but the narrowly subjective 
nature of his interests does at least protect him from being harmed in respect of them by posthumous 
events.  Troy’s prosperity mattered to this Priam only because it served to sustain his own indulgent 
lifestyle; after his death the city’s fate would be unimportant.   An ‘alternative’ Vin Gough, on the 
other hand, with more confidence in his own powers to produce great art and relatively unconcerned 
about his lack of critical success during life, might have painted his works for a posterity which he 
was sure would one day appreciate them.  When posterity does come to appreciate them, this is 
genuinely good for the antemortem subject, fulfilling his major lifetime ambition.  Were people never 
to value them, this would be bad for this Vin Gough, since it would render his painting in vain, a sad 
case of artistic misadventure.  The Pitcher/Feinberg line thus makes much better sense of this revised 
version of Vin Gough’s case than it did of the original. 
     It is often claimed that the satisfaction of some of our desires and ambitions is more plausibly said 
to be good for us, or in our interests, than the satisfaction of others.  If I desire to win the lottery and 
do in fact win it, that result is more clearly good for me than if I desire that you win the lottery and 
you win it.  Moreover some desires are so trivial, transient or disconnected with the things we really 
care about that their coming to pass seems to make no, or a negligible, difference to our well-being.  
The thought that the fulfilment of some of our desires is more significant for our interests than that of 
others has been deployed against Pitcher and Feinberg in the following way.  Some of the causes to 
which a person may devote herself in life, e.g. finding a cure for lung cancer or saving Venice, are not 
concerned with herself, in the sense that their accomplishment would serve other, or other people’s, 
interests rather than her own.  So even if (to borrow Belshaw’s words) a person’s desire that Venice 
should be saved is ‘sustained, … fully embedded in [her] life, realistic, and has involved investment 
and sacrifice’, the problem is to see how the preservation of Venice for many centuries after her death 
can properly be described as being good for her (Belshaw 2009: 141).  Douglas Portmore puts the 
same point succinctly: ‘It is only the non-fulfillment of certain desires, those that pertain to one’s own 
life, that negatively affect one’s welfare’ (Portmore 2007: 28).  The claim that the well-being of the 
antemortem subject is raised by the fact that Venice will last to be enjoyed by people in future ages is 
alleged to be far-fetched, even granting that this outcome had been a major goal of her life.  Well-
being may have its objective components, but it is stretching things to say that a person’s life is made 
objectively better by the posthumous obtaining of circumstances that appear so remote from her.   
      But are they really remote?  Doesn’t that depend on how closely the subject identified herself with 
the aim of saving Venice?  If preserving Venice provided a major part of her raison d’être, then it 
sounds much less unreasonable to say that the posthumous fate of the city impacts on her well-being, 
as rendering her life successfully or unsuccessfully spent.  It is true that there might be rather few 
people who would identify themselves exclusively with a project that, however worthy in itself, has as 
little to do with the normal economy of a human life as this one has; most of us have a range of more 
intimate and personal concerns.  A person who saw herself as a helper-to-save-Venice and not much 
else would strike us as rather inhuman in the narrowness of her interests and her lack of significant 
human relationships.  But if such she was, then the fortunes of Venice after her death would cast 
backward light or shadow over her life, making it to have been more or less successful.  If the 
Serenissima were to sink beneath the waves a few years later, this public tragedy would also mark a 
private failure. If, instead, the city were saved for centuries more, then that would have a positive 
impact on her well-being antemortem.  Yet this judgement is consistent with the claim that the 
restricted nature of her interests sets a ceiling to the extent to which her life can qualify as a life well 
spent.  While the long-term survival of Venice enhances her antemortem well-being, a life lived 
differently – say, where other interests were pursued alongside the commitment to Venice – could 
plausibly be assigned a higher level of well-being overall.  
     Aristotle’s observation that ‘the fortunes of descendants and of all a man’s friends’ can 
posthumously make a difference to his happiness reminds us of a rather more common kind of future-
directed concern (1101a; 1954: 22).  Presumably Aristotle desired that his own son Nicomachus 
would be happy after his father’s death.  This is not a desire that strictly pertains to Aristotle’s life (as 
Portmore would demand); it rather pertains to his son’s.  However, in view of his parental relationship 
its fulfilment might still seem better for the antemortem Aristotle than that of any more impersonal 
desire, such as a desire for the saving of a city.  Brad Hooker has proposed, more liberally, that the 
fulfilment of a desire is good for a person when the state of affairs desired is ‘desired under a 
description that makes essential reference to an agent’ (Hooker 1993: 212).  Aristotle’s desire that 
Nicomachus should be happy after his father’s death looks at first sight like a desire of this kind.  Yet 
consider that parents may love their children because they are their children yet not love them as their 
children; instead they may love them for themselves.  Many people would say that this is the purest 
kind of love, where the objects of affection are loved for their own sakes rather than on account of 
their connection with the lover.  Therefore neither the description of Nicomachus as ‘my son’ nor any 
other self-referring phrase need have entered essentially into the propositional content of Aristotle’s 
desire.  Aristotle may simply have wished that Nicomachus would live happily for as many years as 
befits a young man in contrast with an old one.  Should we in that case conclude that Nicomachus’s 
living happily for twenty years after Aristotle’s death could have made no difference to his father’s 
well-being?   But this, in Aristotle’s own words, would seem ‘a very unfriendly doctrine’ (1101a; 
1954: 22).  If Aristotle, Pitcher and Feinberg are correct that the fortunes of a person’s children or 
friends after his death can impact on his well-being, it seems perverse to suppose that this can only 
happen where the love or concern is of the ‘impure’ type, involving desires for their happiness whose 
propositional content makes essential reference to their status as ‘my son’ or ‘my friend’.   
    Rejecting the view that the fulfilment of desires is only good for a person in the case of desires 
whose propositional content makes essential reference to him allows us to acknowledge a much 
greater range of posthumous desire-fulfilments as potentially contributing to a person’s (antemortem) 
well-being.  This is not to say that the fulfilment or thwarting of just any desire that a person happens 
to have has a bearing on his welfare; as remarked above, some desires are too slight, fleeting or 
unstable for their fulfilment or lack of it to have an impact.  (We should, however, resist Portmore’s 
claim that since any desire, given enough time, is liable to change or fade away, no posthumous 
fulfilment or thwarting of a desire should be considered to have a bearing on the well-being of the 
antemortem subject [Portmore 2007: sect.3].  Even if this questionable psychological premise should 
be true, many actual desires are sufficiently robust and persistent for their posthumous fulfilment to be 
plausibly held to be good for the antemortem subject.)   
 
3. In earlier writing I proposed that posthumous alterations in a person’s reputation should be thought 
of as relational shifts of the kind commonly designated as ‘Cambridge changes’, which depend on 
changes in the intrinsic properties of other things (Scarre 2007: 105-10).  The stock example of a 
Cambridge change is that from being a wife to being a widow which occurs when a woman’s husband 
dies; in this case the woman herself remains unchanged in respect of her intrinsic, i.e. non-relational, 
properties but her husband’s death changes her relationship to him.  Intriguingly, Cambridge changes 
can happen even to things that no longer exist, such as the dead, in virtue of changes to the intrinsic 
properties of other, existing things (cf. Ruben 1988: 232-3).  So when Pope John Paul II died and his 
successor was elected, his predecessor Pope John Paul I Cambridge-changed from being the 
penultimate to being the pene-penultimate pontiff to occupy St Peter’s chair.  In the same way if, 
some years after his death, the formerly neglected Vin Gough becomes recognised as a great painter, 
the change to him is of the Cambridge variety, occurring in virtue of an alteration in the tastes of the 
art-loving public.  This example reminds us that although a person may be gone from the world, he 
can still be the intentional object of thoughts, feelings, praise, blame and a range of other attitudes.  
Moreover, since people care about the intentional attitudes that others hold towards them both in life 
and after death, they may view with pleasure or foreboding prospective posthumous Cambridge 
changes in those attitudes.  For example, Jane may fear that after her death a jealous rival will spread 
slanders about her, damaging her reputation with friends and family.  The thought of the potential 
posthumous Cambridge change from being honourably to dishonourably regarded at a time when she 
will not be around to rebut the slanders may cause her severe mental pain.    
     The possibility of posthumous Cambridge changes, and the fact that antemortem subjects can and 
do view these with attitudes such as hope, fear, anxiety, longing or loathing, initially appears to 
support the case for posthumous harms and benefits.  That prospective posthumous Cambridge 
changes seem desirable or undesirable to their subjects antemortem appears to be reason for regarding 
them, when they occur, as genuinely harmful or beneficial. Yet a sceptic might complain that this 
question-beggingly supposes that subjects are right to look on any posthumous changes in this light.  
While it may be common for people to believe that Cambridge changes of which they are the subjects 
after death can be genuinely good or bad for them, it does not follow that they are.  What good or ill 
can it really do a person if, say, others think well or badly of him after his death?  Perhaps we confuse 
real with intentional objects, and suppose that we can be harmed or benefited qua intentional objects 
though we have ceased to exist as real ones.  Once again, it is the non-existence of the subject at the 
time that the putative harms or benefits occur that poses the problem.   
    The lacuna in the theory, however, can be filled by coupling it more firmly with the 
Pitcher/Feinberg line.  By stressing that it is the antemortem person who is benefited or harmed by 
events occurring posthumously, now construed as Cambridge changes, the sceptic’s ‘no subject’ 
worry can be allayed.  Since the antemortem subject is the flesh and blood person, there is no need to 
suppose, implausibly, that the subject of posthumous harm or benefit must be the intentional object in 
the minds of the survivors.  If Jane’s malicious rival succeeds after her death in damaging Jane’s 
reputation with her untruthful tales, then this is bad for the antemortem Jane in so far as she is the 
subject of a failing ambition to be thought well of by others irrespective of the date.  One might 
conceivably hold that Jane is unwise to care much about how people think about her after her death; 
but probably rather few of us are wholly indifferent about our posthumous reputations, at least 
amongst friends and loved ones.  Because man is a social animal, a major part of his good consists in 
his standing in certain relationships towards his fellows, including such intentional relationships as 
being respected, admired and loved.  It would be very odd to care what people thought of us, but only 
so long as we were alive.  (To test this statement, think how you would feel about a person with 
whom you enjoy mutually loving relations coming to look on you with hatred or loathing after your 
death, having been induced to change her view of you by some ingenious enemy.)  Love and respect 
are not relations that we can complacently look forward to as ending with death.  Where, through 
malice or mischance, they founder posthumously, then their status during life is damaged too; the 
hope for their own continuation that is in part constitutive of them turns out to have been a hope that 
would be dashed.   
      
4. Something superficially resembling the Pitcher/Feinberg view was adumbrated by Kant in some 
pregnant, if undeveloped, remarks in the Metaphysics of Morals.  In a section entitled ‘Leaving 
behind a good reputation after one’s death’, he suggests that ‘Someone who, a hundred years from 
now, falsely repeats something evil about me injures me right now; for in a relation purely of rights, 
which is entirely intellectual, abstraction is made from any physical conditions of time’ (Kant 2001: 
112n; my emphasis). 2 This proposal chimes with Pitcher/Feinberg in so far as it represents a 
posthumous slander as harming the antemortem subject (the obvious rendering of the remark that such 
a slander ‘injures me right now’).  But unlike them Kant construes the harm done as having no 
specific temporal index (‘abstraction is made from any physical conditions of time’).  This may 
suggest that he thinks of it as timeless, but it is more likely that he holds it to be a harm at all times, 
including the present moment (‘right now’), a hundred years before the slander is delivered.  
Implicitly, it was also a harm in the days of the dinosaurs and will still be one after the earth has 
become a burnt cinder.  It is a harm, too, at the very time that the slanderous words are spoken.  Kant 
does not plump for the Pitcher/Feinberg identification of the antemortem person as the sole subject of 
the harm, since on his account the injury, being eternal, affects the subject at all times, including the 
posthumous moment at which the offending words are uttered.  
    Unfortunately Kant seems to be unaware of the problem of the ‘missing subject’, or at least to 
underestimate its gravity.  But his frustratingly brief discussion does gesture towards two possible 
options for tackling it (other than the Pitcher/Feinberg strategy).  The first is to take a leaf out of the 
book of some metaphysicians of time and hold that the subject himself exists eternally.  ‘Eternalists’ 
take the past and future to be equally real with the present and consider existence at different points in 
time to be analogous to location at different points in space.  According to eternalism, if x exists at 
some time, then it is true at all times to say that x exists, where the latter sense of ‘exists’ is an eternal 
one and the former sense is temporally restricted. 3  Therefore when a person ceases to exist in the 
temporally-restricted sense, he continues to exist in the eternal sense; for though he no longer exists in 
the present, he still exists in the past.  The difference between the two senses of ‘exists’ can be 
illustrated by contrasting unicorns and dodos.  While unicorns, since they never existed in the 
temporally-restricted sense, do not exist eternally, dodos exist in the latter sense because they once 
existed in the former.  Yet whatever merits eternalism may have as a general theory of existence, it 
sounds far-fetched to assert that existence in the ‘eternal’ sense can supply the right kind of subject to 
be credibly ascribed posthumous harms or benefits.  It may have been bad for the dodos that the last 
surviving members of their species on the island of Mauritius were eaten by sailors some three 
centuries ago, but this hardly supports the claim that there is in any relevant sense a class of currently-
misfortuned dodos.  (It would also become much harder to explain just why extinction was such a 
tragedy for the dodos, if dodos retained some kind of existence.)  4  To be harmed or benefited 
plausibly requires that a subject exist in the temporally restricted sense, and it is unlikely that Kant, 
with his penchant for ontological economy, would have countenanced the idea of posthumously 
harmed or benefited subjects who exist only in the ‘eternal’ mode.   
    The other option is to propose that it is humanity itself that is injured by such things as posthumous 
slander. It  might be objected that humanity, in the sense of the quality of being human, is not itself 
something capable of being injured or offended; but this difficulty can be removed by taking 
‘humanity’ instead as a collective term for all human beings.  The claim would then be that all human 
beings are affronted when a posthumous slander is uttered against an individual, because we are all 
treated with implicit disrespect when a fellow human being – one with whom we share a common 
human nature – is not shown the respect due to him qua human.  More broadly, any moral offence 
against a human being is an offence against all. 5  Kant shows strong leanings towards this view when 
he cites the shared humanity of the target of a posthumous slander and of a would-be apologist as the 
ground which entitles the latter to speak in the defence of the former.  That he thinks that all are 
affronted when the dead are slandered seems implicit in his remark that rebutting such slanders is not 
merely a moral duty but also the ‘right of humanity as such’ (Kant 2001: 112).  
    But if Kant took this view, he must have seen it as supplementing rather than supplanting that of the 
individual victimhood of the posthumous subject of slander.  For he explicitly says that someone who 
takes up the cudgels on behalf of a slandered dead subject can ‘rightly assume that the dead man was 
wronged by it, even though he is dead, and that this defence brings him satisfaction even though he no 
longer exists’ (ibid.).  The apologist may be speaking for humanity, but he is also speaking for the 
subject who can no longer defend himself.  But, if the eternalist option is rejected, then it seems that 
Kant’s only hope of making this thought intelligible lies in resorting to a Pitcher/Feinberg account that 
identifies the antemortem person as the primary victim of the harm of the slander.  And that Kant 
would not have found this counter-intuitive (had he thought of it) is clear from his claim that the 
living subject of a posthumous slander is already injured a hundred years before the fact.  6    
 
5. So far in this essay I have concentrated on the question of whether posthumous harm is possible, 
and have side-stepped the related question of whether the dead can be wronged.  At first sight it may 
seem easier to grant that the dead can be wronged than that they can be harmed or injured, since the 
absence of a current subject to be affected for the worse seems less of a problem when we consider 
those wrongs that do no actual harm.  So if I tell unflattering lies about someone who never finds out 
how I have spoken nor suffers any other ill consequences from my slanders, I may be said to have 
wronged him even though I do not harm him.  If he should now be dead, I still wrong him by saying 
such things about him; and it would make no difference to my moral culpability if, when I spoke, I did 
not even know whether he was quick or dead.  Or so one might think. Yet the problem of the ‘missing 
subject’ has not really gone away.  It is true that certain things (e.g. telling lies or breaking promises) 
could be said to be wrong tout court, breaches of the moral law as conceived by Kant; and it might be 
claimed that spreading slander about the dead is wrong because spreading slander is always wrong.   
But if we pose the question whether slandering a dead person also wrongs that person, the problem of 
the subject arises just as it does when we ask whether the dead can be harmed.  For there is no 
presently existing subject to be wronged, anymore than there is a current subject capable of being 
harmed.    
    Accordingly, Taylor has argued that ‘the claim that a person has wronged the dead can be 
understood as a claim about wrongdoing that refers to the dead, where such reference does not imply 
that the dead person so referred to has been wronged’ (Taylor 2005: 319).  Such wrongdoing is 
merely of the ‘Kantian’ variety, a breach of moral law. 7  Nevertheless there is a resilient intuition 
that the dead can be wronged (and not merely that there can be ‘wrongdoing that refers to the dead’).  
If I break a promise I make to someone on his deathbed to look after his children, or I falsify his will 
in order to get my hands on his fortune, then I wrong him (along perhaps with other living people).  
Again, the only satisfactory way to vindicate this intuition and beat the ‘no subject’ difficulty is to 
pull the wrong forward into life and identify the antemortem person as the wronged subject.   
   What wrongs may be posthumously done to a person depends, as with harms, on his lifetime 
interests and commitments.  Someone who didn’t care what happened to her corporeal remains would 
not be wronged if we donated them to medical research, unlike another who had made clear her 
objection to having her own so used.  Moral dilemmas can arise in cases where a person believes, but 
others may not, that certain modes of treatment of her remains after her death will be bad for her.  For 
instance, most archaeologists believe that disturbing ancient burials does no harm at all to the people 
whose remains they exhume, but their view may contrast starkly with that once held by the subjects 
themselves.  In some cultures, interfering with the bodies or bones of the dead has been thought to 
cause harm to their spirits or ghosts, and members of such cultures have often gone to great lengths to 
ensure that their remains should be protected against grave-robbers and other ‘trouble-tombs’.  If 
people are deemed to have a moral right to determine what shall be done with and to their remains, 
then archaeologists, even if they correctly believe they do no harm to the spirit world, may still be 
wronging the dead when they disturb their burials in defiance of their wishes. 8   Additionally they 
may be held to harm the dead antemortem by rendering vain their lifetime aspiration to lie 
undisturbed in the grave.  9  
    It is worth remarking, in conclusion, that although harms and wrongs need to be distinguished, they 
are sufficiently intimately related in practice to make it desirable that accounts of posthumous 
harming and posthumous wronging should proceed on similar lines.  Feinberg notes that the word 
‘harm’ is little more than a hook on which a large variety of things can be hung, though not 
everything that we might find unpleasant (such as eating a badly cooked meal, having dental surgery, 
or seeing an offensive poster) is appropriately described as harming us. 10  Yet a cook who 
deliberately served us a disgusting meal would seem to differ only in degree of malice from another 
who intentionally set out to make us sick (an undeniable harm); if the former cook merely wronged 
us, the wrong was not far removed from harm.  Likewise, offending or insulting a person, though 
often classed as instances of wrong rather than harm, may cause considerable mental pain and be 
meant to do so.  And while not all harms are wrongs (some, for instance, are accidental), most 
deliberate causing of harm is also wrong.  If, therefore, we allow – as I have argued in this paper that 
we should – that antemortem persons can be harmed by posthumous actions and events, then it is in 
the interests of theoretical economy to offer a similar account, mutatis mutandis, to explain how 
antemortem persons can also be wronged.   
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Notes 
1. In the actual legend, of course, Priam endured ten years of bitter conflict before the city fell as 
a result of the stratagem of the Trojan Horse.   
2. Thus Mary Gregor’s translation.  The German word translated as ‘injures’ is beleidigt, more 
accurately rendered as ‘offends’ or ‘abuses’, but the significant point is that Kant takes the 
timing to be ‘right now’ (schon  jetzt), during the subject’s lifetime. 
3. I am indebted for this formulation to Mikel Burley (private communication). For further 
discussion of eternalism and its implications for the debates over the badness of death and the 
possibility of posthumous harm, see Bradley 2009: ch.3.   
4. It is in fact more plausible to adopt a Pitcher/Feinberg angle on this avian tragedy and identify 
the once-living dodos – and perhaps especially those of the last few doomed generations – as 
the real subjects of the harm done by the hungry mariners.  They were birds whose interest in 
the transmission of their genes was going to be frustrated. 
5. Does ‘all’ include the dead and the unborn?  Kant would probably say yes in both cases, in 
view of his claim that the relations in which ‘men stand as intelligible beings’ to one another 
hold in abstraction from ‘everything belonging to their existence in time or space’ (Kant 
2001: 112n).  However, to avoid further ‘missing subject’ problems, it would be advisable for 
him to add that it is only when they are alive that they are offended. 
6. Note, however, that in cases where the living person has made it clear that he couldn’t care 
less what people will say about him after his death, posthumous slanders may – pace Kant – 
do him neither harm nor wrong, however they may offend humanity.   
7. To clarify his position, Taylor suggests that putative wrongings of the dead are really to be 
thought of as resembling attempts at wronging a living person that for some contingent reason 
cannot succeed – e.g. where one man attempts to rob another by putting his hand in his empty 
pocket (ibid.).  Just as you cannot steal money that isn’t there, you cannot wrong someone 
who isn’t there.  But this analogy is faulty, since the reason why the dead cannot be wronged 
seems weightier than a merely contingent one: one could attempt to steal money that might 
have been in someone’s pocket but it seems metaphysically impossible to wrong a non-
existent subject.       
8. There cannot, however, be an indefeasible right to have one’s wishes for one’s remains 
respected.  Mill’s harm principle plausibly has a bearing here.  It would not be unreasonable 
for my executors to ignore my instructions for my ashes to be scattered on the summit of 
Mount Everest, in view of the difficulty and expense that this would entail.  And individual 
graves and occasionally whole cemeteries may have to be removed when they pose a health 
risk to the living, or occupy land urgently required for agriculture or settlement.   
9. It may be that a person cannot be wronged antemortem by an act that occurs postmortem 
unless she is also harmed antemortem by that act (Taylor has suggested this to me in a private 
communication).  There are, however, some apparent counterexamples.  Suppose that the 
conscience-stricken dying Jim extracts from his best friend, John, a promise to reveal to the 
world a serious crime he had once committed.  If, wishing to spare Jim’s reputation, John fails 
to keep that promise, he might be said to wrong the antemortem Jim even as he saves him 
from harm.  But against this it could be held that John does some harm to the antemortem Jim 
by rendering Jim’s request a vain one.  While the claim may is hard to prove, I suspect that 
there is rarely, if ever, antemortem wronging without antemortem harming of some kind.  
10. See Feinberg 1984: ch.1 for an extended discussion of harm and its varieties.  
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